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I. INTRODUCTION 
Regulating securities offerings entails balancing investor protection 
and capital formation.1 Inevitably, this balance gets upset. As financial 
markets evolve, Congress passes new legislation, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) adopts new rules, and the courts issue unan-
ticipated opinions. These events upset the balance because they happen 
in an uncoordinated and haphazard manner and oftentimes produce unin-
tended consequences. 
Capital formation under the Securities Act of 19332 (Securities Act) 
occurs through private placements and public offerings, each of which is 
subject to a somewhat distinct securities regulatory regime. This Article 
focuses on the balance between investor protection and capital formation 
with respect to private placements. Specifically, I detail various rule 
changes that were implemented over the years to enhance capital for-
mation. I also discuss other events that have occurred over the same 
timeframe and have weakened investor protection. Based on more than a 
decade of following, researching, and writing about private placement 
regulation, I fear that the latest round of capital formation enhancements 
has tilted the balance too far in favor of capital formation and away from 
investor protection, especially given the size of the private placement 
market today. The purpose of this Article is to draw attention to this po-
tential imbalance so that it can be further studied and debated. Addition-
ally, this Article puts forth a proposal for strengthening private place-
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 1. See David S. Ruder, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation Needs After the 
SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39, 43 (2005); see also The Investor’s Advocate: 
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Aug. 30, 2012) 
(“The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”). 
 2. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 77a-aa). 
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ment investor protection. The proposal is meant to serve as a starting 
point for debate if policymakers conclude rebalancing is needed. 
The Article proceeds as follows. To set the stage, Part II provides 
background on the Securities Act and describes the differences between 
public offerings and private placements. Part III explains why rebalanc-
ing private placement regulation may be warranted. Part IV offers pro-
posed statutory language for a new civil liability provision in the Securi-
ties Act specifically for private placements. Part V concludes. 
II. THE SECURITIES ACT 
Congress enacted the Securities Act in the wake of the stock market 
crash of 1929.3 The Act “was designed to provide investors with full dis-
closure of material information concerning public offerings of securities 
in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through the imposi-
tion of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of honesty 
and fair dealing.”4 The Securities Act contemplates two types of offer-
ings—public and private. 
A. Public Offerings 
Generally, a public offering is an offering of securities marketed to 
the public. Most public offerings must be registered with the SEC.5 A 
company—or more precisely, the “issuer”—registers an offering by fil-
ing a registration statement. Pursuant to SEC regulations, a registration 
statement must set forth, or incorporate by reference, various disclosures 
about the issuer and the offering. These disclosures include audited fi-
nancial statements, comparative selected financial information, and a 
detailed description of the issuer’s business, properties, intended use of 
offering proceeds, transactions with management, legal proceedings, and 
executive compensation.6 If the registration statement is for an issuer’s 
initial public offering (IPO), the SEC carefully reviews and comments on 
it; however, the SEC may or may not review one for a non-IPO.7 Regard-
less, with limited exceptions, no public offering may proceed until the 
SEC declares the underlying registration statement effective. 
                                                 
 3. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (6th ed. 2009). 
 4. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1–5 
(1933)). 
 5. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). 
 6. See id.; 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK §§ 
6:21, 6:23 (2012). 
 7. See Abba David Poliakoff, SEC Review: Comfort or Illusion?, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 40, 43–
45 (1987). 
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As part of the offering process, the issuer must make available to 
the public the prospectus for the offering.8 A prospectus is a subpart of a 
registration statement, and it comprises the bulk of the required disclo-
sures.9 The policy behind the registration and prospectus requirements is 
to provide potential investors with a standard package of information 
about the issuer and offering so that they can make informed investment 
decisions.10 
The registration requirement is negatively reinforced by sections 11 
and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.11 Under section 11, an investor in a 
public offering can sue the issuer, its chief executive officer, chief finan-
cial officer, directors, and the underwriters of the offering if it turns out 
that the issuer’s registration statement contained a material misstatement 
or omission.12 Likewise, under section 12(a)(2), an investor can sue the 
seller of securities if the prospectus contained a material misstatement or 
omission.13 Neither claim requires a plaintiff to prove the defendant acted 
with a particular state of mind; however, with the exception of the issuer 
who is strictly liable, a defendant can avoid liability under both sections 
11 and 12(a)(2) if he performed a reasonable investigation or due dili-
gence of the issuer and the offering.14 These civil liability provisions 
coupled with the due diligence defense are designed to deter erroneous 
disclosure, filter out marginal offerings, and provide a compensation av-
enue to wronged investors. They also supplement public enforcement of 
federal securities laws by enabling plaintiffs to serve as “private attor-
                                                 
 8. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2012). 
 9. See, e.g., Form S-1, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, Part I, 17 
C.F.R. § 239.11 (2005) (specifying the contents of a prospectus). 
 10. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (“The design of the [Securities 
Act] is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to in-
formed investment decisions.”). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(2) (2000). 
 12. Id. § 77k. Technically, the civil liability provisions of the federal securities laws require an 
untrue statement of a material fact or omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. See, e.g., 
id. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2). The customary practice, which I use in this Article, is to use the much short-
er “material misstatement or omission,” although it does not have the exact same meaning. 
 13. Id. § 77l(a)(2). To determine whether someone is a “seller” for purposes of § 12(a)(2), 
courts apply the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), with 
respect to identical language under section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act. In Pinter, the Court held 
that a seller is the “owner who passed title, or other interest in the security, to the buyer for value,” 
or a person “who successfully solicit[ed] the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve 
his own financial interests or those of the securities owner.” 486 U.S. at 642, 647. 
 14. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (providing for a reasonable investigation defense); id. § 77l(a)(2) 
(providing for a reasonable care defense). 
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neys general,” an important consideration given the resource constraints 
of the SEC.15 
Note that section 11 and section 12(a)(2) liability overlaps when a 
material misstatement or omission appears in the prospectus, which is 
often the case given that the prospectus contains or incorporates by refer-
ence the bulk of the required substantive disclosure.16 In other words, it 
is common for a defendant such as an underwriter to get sued under both 
sections. 
Public offerings are undertaken by private companies that want the 
capital infusion and share liquidity that come with the transition to a pub-
lic company through an IPO, and by public companies that want to raise 
additional capital by selling equity or debt securities to the public. Public 
offerings are typically marketed and sold to the public by a syndicate of 
underwriters. 
B. Private Placements 
A private placement or offering is an offering of securities made in 
compliance with an exemption from the registration requirements of the 
Securities Act that prohibits the issuer from marketing the securities to 
the general public. Private placements exist because Congress recognized 
that it did not make sense to require the registration of all securities of-
ferings.17 Thus, it included a number of registration exemptions in the 
Securities Act and empowered the SEC to adopt additional exemptions.18 
Both public and private companies rely on private placement ex-
emptions for a variety of offering types.19 For public companies, offering 
types include sales of debt securities to institutional investors and con-
vertible securities to PIPE20 investors. For private companies, offering 
types include sales of common stock to angel investors, sales of preferred 
stock to venture capital funds, and issuances of stock options to employ-
                                                 
 15. Barbara Black, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: Reliance on 
Deceptive Conduct and the Future of Securities Fraud Class Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 330 (2008) 
(“[E]mpirical studies make clear that the SEC cannot investigate and bring enforcement actions 
against all corporate wrongdoers; the concept of the private plaintiffs acting as a ‘private attorney 
general’ as a necessary supplement to the SEC’s enforcement powers maintains its vitality.” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
 16. See, e.g., Form S-1, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 
239.11 (2005) (specifying the contents of a registration statement and prospectus). 
 17. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 123 (1953). 
 18. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77d (2012). 
 19. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
151, 173–79 (2010). 
 20. See id. at 174. PIPE is an acronym for private investment in public equity. For an overview 
of PIPE investors, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., PIPEs, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 381, 383 
(2007). 
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ees.21 Additionally, investment companies such as hedge funds and ven-
ture capital funds typically rely on private placement exemptions when 
selling interests in their funds to investors.22 Finally, leading up to the 
recent financial crisis, special-purpose vehicles relied on private place-
ment exemptions to sell billions of dollars of collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs), otherwise known as toxic securities.23 
Most private offerings are marketed to investors through an offer-
ing document prepared by the issuer and its counsel, typically called a 
private placement memorandum or PPM.24 A PPM contains the same 
sort of disclosure found in a prospectus so that potential investors can 
make informed investment decisions.25 A PPM, however, is not filed 
with or reviewed by the SEC.26 
Oftentimes, especially in the private-company context, an issuer 
will hire an investment-banking firm to serve as “placement agent” on 
the deal.27 Under this arrangement, the firm markets the offering to in-
vestors on behalf of the issuer in exchange for a commission.28 The 
placement agent also assists the issuer in preparing the PPM.29 
Private placement exemptions (or exclusions) include Rule 144A, 
which limits sales to “qualified institutional buyers”;30 Rule 701, which 
limits sales to employees and consultants of an issuer;31 and Regulation 
S, which limits sales to non-U.S. buyers or securities markets.32 By far, 
the most heavily utilized exemption is Rule 506 of Regulation D,33 so I 
describe it here in more detail. 
                                                 
 21. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation 
and Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4–8 (2004). 
 22. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9354, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464, 54,472 
(proposed Sept. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Eliminating Prohibition]. 
 23. See GERALD T. LINS ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION 
AND COMPLIANCE § 14:18 (2011); see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 155 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
 24. See 1 STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR SMALL & EMERGING COMPANIES § 
6:20 (2011). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. § 6:9. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2012). 
 31. Id. § 230.701. 
 32. Id. §§ 230.901–.905. 
 33. See Vlad Ivanov & Scott Bauguess, Capital Raising in the U.S.: The Significance of Unreg-
istered Offerings Using the Regulation D Exemption 3 (Feb. 2012) (memorandum to Craig Lewis, 
Dir., Div. of Risk, Strategy & Fin. Innovation), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec1031 
11_analysis-reg-d-offering.pdf (noting “that Reg D offerings have been an important if not dominant 
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To fall within Rule 506, either an offering must be limited to ac-
credited investors and no more than thirty-five unaccredited investors or 
the issuer must reasonably believe that there are no more than thirty-five 
unaccredited investors.34 Rule 501(a) defines “accredited investors” as 
the following: banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and certain 
other specified institutional investors;35 individuals with net worth in ex-
cess of $1,000,000 (excluding the equity, if any, of the person’s primary 
residence), annual incomes in excess of $200,000, or joint annual in-
comes in excess of $300,000; and executive officers and directors of the 
issuer.36 Rule 506 also provides that all unaccredited investors in the of-
fering have to be sophisticated, or the issuer at least has to reasonably 
believe that they are sophisticated.37 Securities sold under Rule 506 are 
“restricted,” which means that they generally cannot be resold for at least 
six months following their issuance.38 
The policy underlying Rule 506 is that sophisticated investors can 
fend for themselves and therefore do not need the protections afforded by 
registration.39 The rule uses the accredited-investor concept as a proxy 
for sophistication.40 Thus, so long as an offering is limited to accredited 
investors and no more than thirty-five sophisticated, unaccredited inves-
tors, the thinking goes that it would be inefficient to require registration. 
Notably, investors in a private placement do not have the same re-
course for a material misstatement or omission with respect to the offer-
ing as investors have in a public offering because neither section 11 nor 
section 12(a)(2) applies to a private placement. A private placement in-
vestor can bring a claim under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange 
                                                                                                             
method of capital acquisition since the beginning of 2009”); see also Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., 
The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Ex-
emptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919, 926 (2011) (finding that 94% of Regulation D offerings are made 
under Rule 506). 
 34. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(2)(i), 230.501(e) (2012); see also Eliminating Prohibition, supra 
note 22, at 6. 
 35. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1) (2012). 
 36. See id. § 230.501(a). 
 37. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). Sophistication in this context means that the investor “has such 
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the 
merits and risks of the prospective investment,” either in his own right or with the aid of one or more 
“purchaser representative(s).” Id. For the definition of “purchaser representative,” see id. § 
230.501(h). 
 38. See id. § 230.144(a)(3). 
 39. See id. § 230.506(a). Rule 506 is a section 4(a)(2) safe harbor. In SEC v. Ralston Purina 
Co., the Court held that section 4(a)(2) (which at the time was labeled as section 4(1)) exempted 
offerings made to those who can “fend for themselves” and do not need the protection afforded by 
registration. 346 U.S. 119, 123, 125 (1953). 
 40. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 
50 B.C. L. REV. 639, 666–68 (2009). 
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Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),41 a catchall antifraud provision that applies 
to all securities transactions.42 The rule imposes liability on a person 
who, by use of any means of interstate commerce, makes a material mis-
statement or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of a securi-
ty.43 It does not, however, cast the same specter of liability as sections 11 
and 12(a)(2) do. Specifically, in contrast to claims under those sections, a 
Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must prove, among other things, scienter, reliance, 
and causation.44 
III. WHY REBALANCING MAY BE WARRANTED 
A number of events have occurred over the years that have tilted 
the private placement regulatory balance away from investor protection 
and toward capital formation. First, I discuss changes to private place-
ment regulation that enhanced capital formation (some of them arguably 
also weakened investor protection) and then those that have weakened 
investor protection. Then, I consider the role of state securities regula-
tion. Finally, I analyze the current state of the private placement market. 
A. Facilitating Private Placement Capital Formation 
Notable changes that have facilitated private placement capital for-
mation include the shortening of Rule 144 holding periods, preemption 
of registration requirements in “blue sky” laws, partial lifting of the ban 
on general solicitation and advertising for Rule 506 offerings, and raising 
of the equity-holder trigger of Exchange Act section 12(g)(1). 
1. Holding Period Shortening 
As mentioned above, securities sold under Rule 506 are “restrict-
ed,” which means they cannot be resold until a specific holding period 
has run.45 The policy behind imposing holding periods is to prevent issu-
ers from circumventing the registration requirement for public offerings 
by selling securities in a private placement to an individual with the un-
derstanding that the individual will immediately resell the securities to 
the public.46 
                                                 
 41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp. 
 42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 43. Id. § 240.10b-5(b). 
 44. See 2 BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 6, §§ 27.18, 27.20. 
 45. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
 46. See Notice of Adoption of Rule 144 Relating to the Definition of the Terms “Underwriter” 
in Sections 4(1) and 2(11) and “Brokers’ Transactions” in Section 4(4) of the Securities Act of 1933, 
Adoption of Form 144, and Rescission of Rules 154 and 155 Under that Act, Securities Act Release 
No. 5223, 1972 SEC LEXIS 49, at *18 (Jan. 11, 1972) [hereinafter Notice of Adoption of Rule 144] 
(“This condition is designed to assure that the registration provisions of the Act are not circumvented 
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Rule 144 of the Securities Act specifies the holding period.47 When 
the SEC originally adopted the rule in 1972, the holding period for re-
stricted securities was two years. After the two years had run, the securi-
ties could be sold only if specified information about the company was 
publicly available and then only through a broker, in limited quantities, 
and after filing a form with the SEC.48 
In 1981, the SEC amended Rule 144 to allow a nonaffiliate investor 
(someone other than a director, officer, or greater than 10% shareholder 
of the issuer) to sell restricted securities after three years without com-
plying with the manner-of-sale requirement or quantity limitation.49 Two 
years later, the SEC amended the rule to drop the information require-
ment for resales by nonaffiliates who had held the securities for at least 
three years.50 
In 1997, the SEC amended Rule 144 to reduce the two- and three-
year holding periods to one and two years, respectively.51 The SEC ex-
plained its thinking behind these reductions as follows: 
Shorter holding periods should reduce the cost of capital. This par-
ticularly should benefit smaller companies, which often sell securi-
ties in private placements. A shorter holding period should lower 
the illiquidity discount given by companies raising capital in private 
placements . . . . The [SEC] believes that the shorter holding periods 
will not diminish investor protection, since they are sufficiently 
long to ensure that resales under Rule 144 will not facilitate indirect 
public distributions of unregistered securities by issuers or affili-
ates.52 
In 2007, the SEC again amended Rule 144 to reduce holding peri-
ods.53 This time, it reconfigured the rule somewhat by imposing a differ-
ent holding period depending on whether the issuer of the restricted secu-
rities was a private or public company. Under the amended rule, which 
remains in effect today, the holding period is one year for securities is-
sued by a private company and six months for securities issued by a pub-
                                                                                                             
by persons acting, directly or indirectly, as conduits for an issuer in connection with resales of re-
stricted securities.”). 
 47. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (2012). 
 48. See Notice of Adoption of Rule 144, supra note 46, at *1. 
 49. See Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding Period of 
Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6806, 1988 SEC LEXIS 
2104, at *83 (Oct. 25, 1988). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rule 144 and 145, Securities Act Release 
No. 7390, 1997 SEC LEXIS 380, at *1 (Feb. 20, 1997). 
 52. Id. at *3–*4. 
 53. See Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 8869, 2007 SEC LEXIS 
2850 (Dec. 6, 2007). 
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lic company. Once the one year or six months has run, a nonaffiliate in-
vestor is free to resell, by any means, any amount of the securities to an-
yone, including an unsophisticated, unaccredited investor, even if the 
securities are those of a private company for which there is little or no 
information publicly available. The SEC again cited increasing the li-
quidity of privately placed securities and decreasing the cost of capital 
formation as its primary rationales for the changes.54 It also declared, 
without explanation, that these changes do not compromise investor pro-
tection.55 
The SEC’s claim regarding the 2007 changes and their effects on 
investor protection is dubious, but I will assume it is true, at least when 
considered in isolation. The larger point is that each change over the 
years incrementally improves the liquidity56 of privately placed securi-
ties, which, in turn, enhances capital formation in two respects. First, as 
the SEC mentioned, the changes reduce the illiquidity discount required 
by investors. An illiquidity discount is in part comprised of the amount 
an investor decreases from what she is willing to pay for an issuer’s re-
stricted securities, given that she cannot immediately resell them. Fur-
thermore, prior to 2007, depending on how long she held the securities, 
the investor would have had to meet other requirements not applicable to 
unrestricted securities.57 Thus, shortening the holding period while elim-
inating the broker, the information requirements, and the quantity limita-
tion, reduces the illiquidity discount required by investors. In other 
words, issuers will be able to charge higher prices for their securities re-
sulting in them raising more capital. Second, some people may have been 
unwilling to invest in privately placed securities if they would have been 
more or less prohibited from freely reselling for three years. As a result, 
reducing this period from three years to a one-year maximum increases 
the pool of potential investors, which likely enables issuers to raise more 
capital through private placements. 
2. Blue Sky Laws Preemption 
Offers and sales of securities are subject to both federal securities 
laws and state securities laws (known as blue sky laws).58 Historically, 
under the blue sky laws of most states, any offering of securities within 
                                                 
 54. See id. at *2. 
 55. Id. 
 56. In this context, liquidity refers to the ease with which an investor can sell securities. Hold-
ing periods, information and filing requirements, and similar provisions make it harder for an inves-
tor to resell. Thus, securities subject to these limitations are considered less liquid. 
 57. The largest component of an illiquidity discount for private-company shares results from 
the lack of a public market for the shares. 
 58. 1 BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 6, § 1:5. 
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the state’s borders either had to be registered with the state or had to fall 
within an exemption from registration.59 Thus, to avoid state registration, 
a private placement had to fall within an exemption under the blue sky 
laws of each state in which investors were solicited. As a result, conduct-
ing a multistate private placement was burdensome for an issuer because 
state exemptions varied from federal exemptions and from state to 
state.60 In response to this burden and other concerns, Congress enacted 
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), 
which partially preempted blue sky registration requirements.61 Included 
within this preemption are sales of securities in reliance on Rule 506.62 In 
other words, following NSMIA’s enactment, an issuer no longer had to 
deal with registering a Rule 506 offering or verifying the availability of 
an exemption in any state because blue sky registration requirements no 
longer applied. A stated purpose of NSMIA was “to promote efficiency 
and capital formation in the financial markets.”63 
3. Ban Lifting 
Until 2012, Rule 506 totally prohibited an issuer or anyone acting 
on its behalf from soliciting investors through general solicitation and 
advertising—a prohibition the SEC has interpreted broadly.64 In particu-
lar, the SEC commonly considers as general solicitation the solicitation 
of anyone with whom the company or someone acting on its behalf does 
not have a pre-existing, substantive relationship.65 The SEC considers a 
relationship pre-existing if it is established prior to the solicitation for the 
particular offering.66 The SEC considers a relationship substantive if it 
“would enable the issuer (or a person acting on its behalf) to be aware of 
the financial circumstances or sophistication of the persons with whom 
the relationship exists or that otherwise are of some substance and dura-
tion.”67 As a result of this interpretation, a company raising capital 
                                                 
 59. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 
10 J. CORP. L. 553, 556 (1985). 
 60. See Therese H. Maynard, The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How ‘Uniform’ is 
‘Uniform?’—An Evaluation and Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY L.J. 357, 360 (1987). 
 61. Pub. L. No 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 77r. 
 63. 110 Stat. at 3416. 
 64. See Sjostrom, supra note 21, at 12–15. 
 65. See Robert T. Willis, Jr., P.C., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 34, at *2 
(Jan. 18, 1988); see also Eliminating Prohibition, supra note 22, at 13. 
 66. See E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2917, at *2 
(Dec. 3, 1985). 
 67. Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
2811, at *2 (Dec. 4, 1985). 
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through a Rule 506 offering was essentially limited to seeking funds 
from investors it, or someone working on its behalf, already knew to 
such an extent that it had knowledge of the person’s sophistication and 
financial circumstances.68 
Congress directed the SEC to partially lift the ban in the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act).69 Specifically, Title II of the Act 
requires the SEC to revise Rule 506 to allow general solicitation and ad-
vertising in Rule 506 offerings limited to accredited investors.70 In Au-
gust of 2012, the SEC proposed an amendment to Rule 506 to that ef-
fect.71 Finalization of the amendment is anticipated this year. With the 
ban soon to be removed for offerings limited to accredited investors, is-
suers will be able to reach out to a much larger pool of potential inves-
tors, which, again, likely enables them to raise more capital through pri-
vate placements.72 
4. Trigger Raising 
Historically, section 12(g)(1) essentially required a private compa-
ny to go public once it had over $10 million in assets and 500 or more 
shareholders.73 This 500-shareholder trigger implicitly constrained capi-
tal raising for private companies because it effectively limited the total 
number of equity investors a private company could accept to 499. For 
most companies, the number was even lower because market norms re-
quired them to issue shares to employees, thus reducing the number of 
slots available for investors. 
Title V of the JOBS Act raised the trigger to 2,000 shareholders (so 
long as at least 1,500 of such shareholders are accredited investors) and 
excluded from this count employees who received unregistered shares as 
part of their compensation.74 The end result is that private companies will 
be able to take on more investors than before without having to go pub-
lic, and thus, they will be able to remain private longer than in the past, 
resulting in more capital being raised through private placements. 
                                                 
 68. See Sjostrom, supra note 21, at 14. 
 69. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 70. See id. § 201(a)(1). 
 71. See Eliminating Prohibition, supra note 22. 
 72. See id. at 47. 
 73. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. ONLINE 43 (2011). 
 74. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 501. 
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B. Weakening Investor Protection 
Notable events that have weakened investor protection include the 
confinement of Securities Act section 12(a)(2) to public offerings, the 
narrowing of Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, and the SEC’s failure to adjust 
the definition of accredited investor for inflation. 
1. Section 12(a)(2) Confinement 
As discussed above, section 12(a)(2) applies to material misstate-
ments and omissions from a prospectus.75 Section 2(a)(10) of the Securi-
ties Act defines the term prospectus to include essentially any written 
communication that offers a security for sale.76 Thus, for decades most 
courts and commentators assumed that section 12(a)(2) applied to private 
placements because PPMs and other written offering materials seemingly 
fell within the definition of prospectus.77 Things changed, however, in 
1995 when the Supreme Court decided Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.78 
The case involved the petitioners’ sale of a manufacturing company 
to the respondents.79 The sale was structured as a stock purchase, mean-
ing the petitioners sold 100% of the company’s outstanding stock to re-
spondents.80 The parties consummated the sale pursuant to a stock pur-
chase agreement that contained various representations and warranties 
about the company.81 Petitioners did not register their sales of securities 
with the SEC but instead relied on a private placement exemption for 
compliance with the Securities Act.82 
Following closing of the sale, respondents claimed that representa-
tions and warranties in the stock purchase agreement regarding the finan-
cial data of the company were inaccurate.83 Thus, they sued petitioners 
for rescission under section 12(a)(2) claiming that the stock purchase 
agreement was a prospectus containing material misstatements.84 
After applying dubious statutory interpretation,85 the Court con-
cluded that “the word ‘prospectus’ is a term of art referring to a docu-
ment that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or control-
                                                 
 75. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2012). 
 77. See COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 3, at 521. 
 78. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
 79. Id. at 564. 
 80. Id. at 565. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 565–66. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Elliott J. Weiss, Securities Act Section 12(2) After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: What 
Questions Remain?, 50 BUS. LAW. 1209, 1212–13 (1995). 
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ling shareholder.”86 Because the sale of stock at issue did not involve a 
public offering, the stock purchase agreement was not a prospectus and 
therefore section 12(a)(2) did not apply to the transaction.87 In other 
words, section 12(a)(2) does not apply to private placements. 
An unsettled issue from Gustafson is the definition of public offer-
ing for purposes of section 12(a)(2). The issue is complicated by the fact 
that using the distinction between registered and exempt does not work 
because some types of exempt offerings are marketed to the public.88 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held in a different context that an 
offering made to those who cannot “fend for themselves”—namely, un-
sophisticated investors—is a public offering even if the offering is not 
made to the public at large.89 Regardless, it is highly unlikely a court 
would consider a Rule 506 offering as public given that Rule 506 states 
that offers and sales of securities made in compliance with the rule “shall 
be deemed to be transactions not involving any public offering.” 90 This 
language dates back to 1982 when the SEC originally adopted Rule 
506.91 In other words, it was not included in light of Gustafson. It is there 
because Rule 506 is a section 4(a)(2) safe harbor. Specifically, an offer-
ing made in compliance with Rule 506 is deemed to fall within section 
4(a)(2) of the Securities Act, and exempts from registration “transactions 
by an issuer not involving any public offering.”92 
2. Rule 10b-5 Narrowing 
As mentioned above, Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act is a catchall 
antifraud provision that applies to all securities transactions. It imposes 
liability on a person who, by use of any means of interstate commerce, 
makes a material misstatement or omission in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of a security.93 Following Gustafson, it is basically the only 
                                                 
 86. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 584 (emphasis added). 
 87. See id. 
 88. For example, offerings made in reliance on the exemption provided by Rule 251 of Regula-
tion A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251, can be marketed to the public. See 1 BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra 
note 6, § 7.2. 
 89. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 123, 125 (1953); supra note 39.  
 90. Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited 
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 1982 WL 35662, at *27 (Mar. 8, 1982). 
 91. See id. 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012). Note that the JOBS Act changed the numbering of the sec-
tion from 4(2) to 4(a)(2). 
 93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2012). Note that section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 
28 U.S.C.), extended the statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 claims from the earlier of one year 
after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation or three years after the violation, to two 
years after discovery or five years after the violation. 
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claim available under federal securities law to a private placement inves-
tor. But as a result of repeated narrowing, it is not a great one. 
Notably, four Supreme Court decisions and a Congressional act 
contributed to this narrowing. First, the Supreme Court held in 1976 that 
a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff has to prove that the defendant acted with scienter 
in making the material misstatement or omission.94 Second, in 1991, the 
Supreme Court essentially shortened the statute of limitations on Rule 
10b-5 claims by overruling lower courts’ practice of using forum states’ 
statutes of limitations.95 Third, the Supreme Court held in 1976 that there 
is no private right of action against a party that aided and abetted a Rule 
10b-5 violation.96 Fourth, Congress passed the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995, which heightened the pleading standard for a 
Rule 10b-5 claim by requiring a plaintiff to plead “with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference [of scienter].”97 Finally, in 2011, 
the Supreme Court contracted the list of potential defendants when it 
held that a maker of a statement for purposes of Rule 10b-5 is limited to 
“the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, includ-
ing its content and whether and how to communicate it.” 98 
One of the few big developments during the above timeframe that 
was favorable for plaintiffs bringing Rule 10b-5 claims was the Supreme 
Court’s adoption in 1988 of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reli-
ance.99 Under this presumption, a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff does not have to 
prove it relied on the alleged material misstatement or omission; it only 
has to prove that the securities at issue trade in an efficient market.100 
                                                 
 94. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213–14 (1976). The Court described scienter as 
“a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Id. at 193 n.12. Lower courts 
have since uniformly held that recklessness suffices. 
 95. Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359–63 (1991). 
 96. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191–92 (1994). 
 97. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A)). The Act did 
not define “strong inference” but the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd., ruling that in order to qualify as “strong,” “an inference of scienter must be 
more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any op-
posing inference of nonfraudulent intent.” 551 U.S. 308, 309 (2007). 
 98. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011). The 
Court added that “[w]ithout control, a person or entity can merely suggest what to say, not ‘make’ a 
statement in its own right.” Id. 
 99. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
 100. As the Court explained, the presumption “is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and 
developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material 
information regarding the company and its business.” Id. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 
1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)). Hence, material misstatements or omissions will “defraud purchasers 
of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.” Id. at 241–42. Courts 
typically apply the five factors set forth in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989) to 
determine whether shares of stock trade in an efficient market. These factors are the following: (1) 
the stock’s trading volume; (2) the number of analysts following the issuer; (3) the number of market 
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This presumption opened the door to Rule 10b-5 class action lawsuits 
because class certification would no longer be denied due to individual 
questions of reliance predominating over common questions. The pre-
sumption, however, is of no help to a plaintiff bringing a Rule 10b-5 
claim against a private company given that a private company’s shares 
by definition do not trade in an efficient market.101 Nor is it of any help 
to a plaintiff bringing a Rule 10b-5 claim against a public company relat-
ing to, for example, privately placed debt securities that do not trade in 
an efficient market. 
Of the above developments, the most problematic for an investor in 
a private placement is the heightened pleading standard. In particular, 
pleading facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter is difficult be-
cause a plaintiff must do so before discovery. Meeting this standard will 
often be impossible in a suit against a private company because there will 
be no company or insider SEC filings from which the plaintiff can pull 
facts for its pleading. 
As for the scienter requirement, it may create a perverse incentive 
for private offering participants to be less thorough in their due diligence. 
Specifically, courts have held that a defendant who had a “white heart” 
but “empty head” with respect to a misstatement or omission did not act 
with scienter.102 Thus, offering participants may not dig as deeply as they 
otherwise might so that they can later claim a white heart but empty 
head. 
Note that the Supreme Court and Congress have narrowed Rule 
10b-5 largely out of concern that vexatious class actions would be 
brought against public companies following a sudden drop in their stock 
prices.103 Consequently, it does not reflect a deliberate choice as to the 
proper level of civil liability exposure for a private placement. 
3. Failure to Adjust 
An individual qualifies as an accredited investor if he or she (1) 
makes more than $200,000 a year or, together with his or her spouse, 
more than $300,000 a year; or (2) has a net worth in excess of 
$1,000,000 (excluding the equity, if any, of the person’s primary resi-
dence).104 The SEC set these dollar thresholds when it adopted Regula-
                                                                                                             
makers for the stock; (4) the eligibility of the issuer to file a Form S-3 registration statement; and (5) 
the stock price’s reaction to unexpected new events. Id. at 1286–87. 
 101. See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 43 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 102. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 103. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-50, at 16–20 (1995); see also COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, 
supra note 3, at 663. 
 104. Ironically, the exclusion of home equity from the net worth calculation was added by 
Congress in 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
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tion D in 1982, and the SEC has never adjusted them for inflation.105 
Hence, the dollar amounts have dropped significantly in real dollars as 
the result of inflation. Specifically, $1.00 in 1982 is worth $2.40 in 
2012.106 Thus, the $200,000, $300,000, and $1,000,000 thresholds, had 
they been adjusted for inflation, would today be $474,000, $948,000, and 
$2,370,000, respectively.107 In other words, inflation has decreased the 
thresholds in real dollars by approximately 58% since adoption. 
As applied to individuals, the accredited investor concept is based 
on the assumption that rich people are sophisticated or at least can sus-
tain a complete loss of an investment in a private placement without suf-
fering financial ruin. This assumption was not particularly sound in 1982 
but was at least understandable given the desire for an objective proxy 
for sophistication. The lack of inflation adjustment, however, means that 
many more individuals qualify as accredited investors than in 1982. As a 
result, considerably fewer individuals are protected from foolishly in-
vesting in private placements. 
In 2007, the SEC proposed adjusting the thresholds for inflation 
“on a going forward basis, starting on July 1, 2012, and every five years 
thereafter” using 2006 as the base year;108 however, for reasons un-
known, it never adopted the proposal. 
C. State Law 
As mentioned above, offers and sales of securities are subject to 
both federal and state securities laws. While NSMIA preempted blue sky 
registration requirements for Rule 506 offerings, it did not preempt the 
application of blue sky civil liability provisions. Many states have a pro-
vision similar to section 12(a)(2) that imposes liability on those who sell 
securities using, for example, a PPM that contains a material misstate-
ment or omission.109 
                                                                                                             
Congress passed the legislation in the wake of the financial crisis that, among other things, drastical-
ly reduced everyone’s home equity. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010). 
 105. See Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release 
No. 8825, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116, 45,126 (proposed Aug. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Revisions of Limited 
Offering Exemptions]. 
 106. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
 107. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions, supra note 105. 
 108. Id. at 45,126. 
 109. For example, section 509(b) of the Uniform Securities Act of 2002, which seventeen 
states have enacted, provides as follows: 
A person is liable to the purchaser if the person sells a security . . . by means of an untrue 
statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which it is made, not mis-
2013] Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation 1159 
The existence of these provisions blunts the impact of Gustafson to 
some extent. But it is not an investor panacea for several reasons. First, 
some states only have scienter-based provisions, and New York’s provi-
sion can be enforced only by its attorney general,110 notwithstanding all 
the private placement activity that originates in the state. Second, courts 
have held that a plaintiff can only sue under a particular state’s blue sky 
laws if activities with respect to the offering at issue were conducted in 
the state.111 Third, a federal court in Ohio recently held that an antifraud 
cause of action was not available under an Ohio blue sky law for non-
Ohio purchasers of securities issued by an Ohio entity.112 This clouded 
the extraterritorial application of blue sky antifraud provisions. Fourth, 
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 prohibits certain 
class actions under state law for misstatements or omissions in connec-
tion with the sale of securities.113 Specifically, an investor in a private 
placement of common or preferred stock by a public company with 
shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ could not 
bring a class action under a blue sky law, even if the PPM was littered 
with material misstatements and omissions.114 As a result, investor re-
course under blue sky law is essentially left to chance. Available reme-
dies vary by state, depend on where offering activities occurred, and may 
be limited to state residents. 
A plaintiff could potentially bring claims under state common law 
or equitable claims such as rescission, deceit, and, in some states, equita-
ble fraud.115 However, a rescission claim generally requires proof of reli-
ance, which likely forecloses bringing the claim as a class action.116 De-
                                                                                                             
leading, the purchaser not knowing the untruth or omission and the seller not sustaining 
the burden of proof that the seller did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
could not have known of the untruth or omission. 
 110. See Bd. of Managers v. Fairways at N. Hills, 150 A.D.2d 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
 111. See Robert N. Rapp, Misapplication of the Federal Extraterritoriality Principle in Limit-
ing the Scope of Civil Remedies for Fraud Under State Blue Sky Laws, 39 SEC. REG. L.J. 279 (2011). 
 112. See In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 755 F. Supp. 2d 857, 888 (S.D. Ohio 
2010). 
 113. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at various parts of 15 U.S.C. ch. 2b). 
 114. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (prohibiting class actions with respect to “covered securities”); id. 
§ 77f(1) (defining a “covered security” by referencing subsection (1) and (2) of section 18(b) of the 
Securities Act); id. § 77r(b)(1)(C) (providing that “covered security” includes “a security of the same 
issuer that is equal in seniority or that is a senior security to a security” the issuer has listed on the 
NYSE or NASDAQ); id. § 77r(d)(4) (defining “senior security” to include “any stock of a class 
having priority over any other class as to distribution of assets or payment of dividends”). 
 115. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Secu-
rities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21 (1998). 
 116. See 2 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1553 (2011). 
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ceit requires proof of scienter,117 which, as discussed above, is difficult to 
plead and prove in the private offering context.118 
D. Analysis 
Over the last two decades there have been a number of significant 
changes to federal securities laws designed to enhance private placement 
capital formation, and they appear to have worked well. According to a 
February 2012 SEC report that provided data for 2009, 2010, and the 
first quarter of 2011, capital raised through Regulation D offerings was 
(1) more than double the capital raised though public equity offerings 
during that timeframe; (2) second only to public debt offerings in 2009; 
and (3) the largest source of capital in 2010 and through the first quarter 
of 2011.119 The bar graph below, which is reproduced from the SEC re-
port, reflects these three points.120 
 
Figure 1: Aggregate Capital Raised in 2009, 2010, and Q1 2011 by 
Offering Method ($billions) 
 
Note that the graph breaks down private offerings into four differ-
ent categories—Regulation D, Rule 144A, Regulation S, and other pri-
vate offerings—presumably because the report focuses on Regulation D 
offerings. Hence, depicting aggregate capital raised in private placements 
                                                 
 117. See id. at 1555. 
 118. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 119. Ivanov & Bauguess, supra note 33. 
 120. Id. 
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during the specified years would require redoing the graph to stack the 
bars of each of these four different categories on top of one another. This 
means that capital raised in private placements exceeded $1 trillion in 
2010 and was on pace to do so for 2011. With the impending partial lift-
ing of the ban on general solicitation and advertising for Rule 506 offer-
ings and the increase in the section 12(g)(1) trigger, the growth of the 
private placement market is likely to accelerate. 
Although private placements have eclipsed public offerings in 
terms of total dollars raised, virtually nothing has been done in decades 
to strengthen investor protection in this area.121 Thus, there is this giant 
market segment whose growth is likely to accelerate subject to very little 
regulatory oversight and only a weak liability rule. I fear that this dynam-
ic results in underdeterrence of erroneous disclosure and under-
encouragement of due diligence for private placements and may give rise 
to systemic risk concerns. My intuition may be off base, but at a mini-
mum, the SEC should closely monitor the size of the market and investor 
complaints arising out of private placements. It should also gather more 
historical data on these two aspects to better inform any policy debate. 
IV. REBALANCING PROPOSAL 
My proposal is meant as a starting point for a stage-two discussion. 
Stage one would involve fact gathering and debate over whether re-
balancing is necessary. If the answer is yes, the discussion would then 
presumably move to stage two—a debate of what exactly should be 
done. Thus, my proposal reflects necessarily preliminary thoughts (given 
that the stage-one discussion has yet to occur) and is meant to serve as a 
starting point for a stage-two debate. 
I generally support all the changes to federal securities laws dis-
cussed above that were made to enhance capital formation. In fact, in a 
2004 article, I argued that the SEC should relax the ban on general solici-
tation and advertising,122 and in an article published last year, I encour-
aged the SEC to liberalize the section 12(g)(1) trigger.123 I support the 
changes largely because private placements are an extremely important 
                                                 
 121. I am only aware of three instances of strengthening: (1) the SEC amending Rule 504 in 
1999 to reverse its earlier decision to allow general solicitation and remove resale restrictions, see 
Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the “Seed Capital” Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 
7644, 1999 WL 95490, at *1 (Feb. 25, 1999); (2) Congress changing the definition of accredited 
investor to exclude home equity from the net worth calculation, see supra note 104; and (3) Con-
gress expanding the “bad actor” disqualifier for Rule 506 offerings. I do not count the extension of 
the Rule 10b-5 statute of limitations noted earlier because it was not aimed at private placement 
investor protection. See supra sources cited at note 93. 
 122. See Sjostrom, supra note 21. 
 123. See Sjostrom, supra note 73. 
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source of capital for emerging companies, private placements are the 
growth engines of our economy, and access to capital is critical to their 
success. Thus, my proposal calls for rebalancing by increasing investor 
protection. Set forth below is suggested statutory language to that end. 
A. Suggested Statutory Language 
 
Sec. 11A. PRIVATE PLACEMENT CIVIL LIABILITIES 
 
(a) In the event any security is sold (i) in an issuer transaction ex-
empt under section 4(a)(2) or commission rules or regulations issued un-
der section 4(a)(2) or section 3(b), or (ii) under Rule 144A in connection 
with an issuer transaction,124 by means of any written or oral communica-
tion which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, 
any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of 
such acquisition the acquirer knew of such untruth or omission) may, 
either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue— 
(1) the issuer; 
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing simi-
lar functions) or partner in, the issuer at the time of the transaction; 
(3) every person who was a principal executive officer, principal fi-
nancial officer, principal accounting officer, or controller of the issuer 
(and any person occupying a similar status or performing a similar func-
tion) at the time of the transaction; and 
(4) every placement agent (as defined by the commission by rule) 
with respect to the transaction to recover the consideration paid for such 
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received 
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if such person 
no longer owns the security. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), no person, 
other than the issuer, shall be liable who shall sustain the burden of proof 
that he has met the due diligence defense as defined by the commission 
by rule. 
                                                 
 124. This language is necessary so that section 11A applies to Rule 144A offerings that involve 
the sale by an issuer to a placement agent in reliance on section 4(a)(2) or Rule 506 followed by the 
immediate resale by the placement agent to investors in reliance on Rule 144A. 
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(c) Subsection (a) shall not apply, except with respect to an issuer, 
to (i) a transaction that was part of an offering sold only to accredited 
investors as defined in section 230.501 of title 17, Code of Federal Regu-
lations, provided that the acquirer signed a writing expressly waiving 
application (notwithstanding section 14), and (ii) a transaction that was 
part of an offering sold only to qualified institutional buyers as defined in 
section 230.144A of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, unless the 
issuer signed a writing expressly consenting to its application. 
As well as adding this suggested language, Congress would need to 
include a reference to section 11A in section 13 of the Securities Act 
(statute of limitations) and section 15 of the Securities Act (control-
person liability) so that those sections apply to section 11A claims. 
My proposal is modeled after section 11 of the Securities Act (that 
is why I labeled it “section 11A”). I chose this route as opposed to simp-
ly proposing to legislatively reverse Gustafson—an approach that has 
been floated in recent years125—for two reasons. First, section 12(a)(2) is 
really just a supplement to section 11. Its main effect is to extend civil 
liability to broker-dealers, given that it only applies to “sellers,” and the 
only other sellers in a public offering are the issuer and underwriters, 
both of whom are subject to section 11 liability. Second, unlike section 
11, section 12(a)(2) does not provide strict liability for an issuer. Consid-
ering the size of the private placement market, I believe a provision that 
imposes strict liability on the issuer and primary liability on an issuer’s 
directors, chief executive officer, chief financial officer, and the place-
ment agent for the offering is warranted.126 
                                                 
 125. For example, in 2010, Senator Carl Levin introduced amendments to the Dodd-Frank Act 
that included a section called the “Gustafson Fix.” See S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 212 (2010). The 
amendment would have changed the definition of prospectus under Securities Act section 2(a)(10) to 
make clear that it includes any written communication offering a security in a registered or exempt 
transaction. The amendment was not, however, included in the enacted version of the legislation. 
 126. Congress appears to have tacitly agreed in the JOBS Act that section 12(a)(2) liability, 
standing alone, is too narrow. Specifically, the “crowdfunding” exemption of the JOBS Act includes 
a liability provision similar to section 12(a)(2) that is applicable only to an “issuer.” See Pub. L. No. 
112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. 306, 315–18 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d). The provision then 
defines issuer to include an issuer’s directors, chief executive officer, and chief financial officer. Id. I 
recognize that an issuer’s officers and directors are potentially liable for a section 12(a)(2) violation 
by the issuer under the control-person liability provision of section 15 of the Securities Act. Such a 
claim, however, is often difficult for a plaintiff to prevail on because courts have required a plaintiff 
to prove the person (1) “actually participated in (namely, exercised control over) the operations of 
the [company] in general,” and (2) “possessed the power to control the specific transaction or activi-
ty upon which the primary violation is predicated.” Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 
1985) (quoting Metge v. Baehler, 577 F. Supp. 810, 817–18 (S.D. Iowa 1984)). Additionally, some 
courts also require a plaintiff to prove that the defendant was an active participant in the violation or 
that the person’s inaction “was deliberate and done intentionally to further the fraud.” See, e.g., 
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 1981). 
1164 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1143 
As with section 11, my proposal affords all defendants, other than 
the issuer, a due diligence defense.127 In contrast to section 11, I delegate 
to the SEC the task of specifying what exactly a particular category of 
defendants needs to do to meet the defense.128 The due diligence defense 
under section 11 has been left largely to the courts. Because of the fre-
quency of pretrial settlements in securities fraud cases, the defense re-
mains somewhat ill-defined with Escott v. BarChris Construction 
Corp.,129 a 1968 federal district court opinion, still serving as the leading 
case.130 Going with SEC rulemaking instead would allow the SEC to 
gather public input and then specify what exactly various offering partic-
ipants need to do, tailor the defense to different types of private place-
ments, and periodically update the defense in light of changing market 
practices or rules. It would also provide potential investors with more 
certainty as to the extent of due diligence performed in connection with 
an offering, which they can then take into account in deciding how much 
they are willing to pay for the offered securities. What I have in mind is 
something akin to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
Regulatory Notice 10-22, which details various practices a broker-dealer 
participating in a private placement should undertake in investigating the 
issuer.131 
Subsection (c) of my proposal provides flexibility as to the applica-
bility of section 11A. Specifically, it allows investors in offerings sold 
only to accredited investors to waive application except as to the issuer. 
For offerings limited to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs),132 it pro-
vides a “no application” default rule except with respect to the issuer. 
Hence, my proposal sets an immutable rule for offerings where unac-
credited investors participate, an opt-out rule for offerings limited to ac-
credited investors, and an opt-in rule for offerings limited to QIBs. This 
approach is grounded in the fundamental principle of U.S. securities laws 
                                                 
 127. See Pub. L. No. 73-38, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
 128. See id. 
 129. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 130. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Diligence Defense Under Section 11 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 549, 549 (2006). 
 131. See Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Regulation D Offerings: Obligation of Broker-Dealers 
to Conduct Reasonable Investigations in Regulation D Offerings, Reg. Notice 10-22 (Apr. 2010), 
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p121 
304.pdf. FINRA is the quasi-governmental, self-regulatory organization that oversees all securities 
firms doing business in the United States. 
 132. Subject to limited exceptions, a QIB is an institutional investor (for example, an employee 
benefit plan, hedge fund, insurance company, mutual fund, or pension fund) that “acting for its own 
account or the accounts of other qualified institutional buyers . . . in the aggregate owns and invests 
on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the 
entity.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i). See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 
144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 409, 424–26 (2008). 
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that sophisticated investors can “fend for themselves” and therefore re-
quire considerably fewer legal safeguards.133 Thus, my proposal provides 
the most protection for unaccredited investors (presumably the least so-
phisticated), less protection for accredited investors (presumably sophis-
ticated134), and the least protection for QIBs (presumably the most so-
phisticated135). Note that an investor who meets the QIB definition also 
necessarily meets the definition of accredited investor. 
More importantly, my proposal allows accredited investors and 
QIBs to contractually tailor a liability regime for a particular transaction, 
which leads to greater efficiency. For example, a venture capital investor 
who has done extensive due diligence on an issuer may prefer that sec-
tion 11A not apply to an issuer’s directors and officers instead of paying 
the extra money the issuer would presumably demand if it applied. Al-
ternatively, the parties may prefer some other type of liability regime for 
a particular transaction—a different limitations period, a cap on damag-
es, a different list of potential defendants—than the one provided by sec-
tion 11A. This sort of tailoring is not currently possible because both the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act render advance waivers of claims 
void.136 
Issuers and placement agents are likely to respond to section 11A(c) 
by including a waiver of the provision as a matter of course in their pri-
vate placement subscription agreements, the document an investor signs 
to invest. Even if this is the case, the waiver is applicable only if all in-
vestors are accredited and, regardless, does not waive section 11A’s ap-
plication to the issuer. Nor does it waive liability under Rule 10b-5 or 
control-person liability under section 15.137 Furthermore, a waiver gener-
ally requires a “voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known 
                                                 
 133. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
 134. I say “presumed” because the definition of accredited investor uses income and assets as a 
proxy for sophistication, and thus the definition is both under- and over-inclusive. See generally 
Sjostrom, supra note 40, at 666–69. 
 135. See Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding Period of 
Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6806, 53 Fed. Reg. 
44,016, 44,028 (Nov. 1, 1988) (defining the QIB as “identifying a class of investors that can be 
conclusively assumed to be sophisticated and in little need of the protection afforded by the Securi-
ties Act’s registration provisions”). 
 136. See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquir-
ing any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regu-
lations of the Commission shall be void.” (emphasis added)); id. § 78cc(a) (“Any condition, stipula-
tion, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of 
any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.” 
(emphasis added)). This is why I include the “notwithstanding section 14” parenthetical in section 
11A(c). 
 137. This assumes that section 15 is amended to so provide. 
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right.”138 Thus, courts have some flexibility to invalidate a purported 
waiver. 
B. Some Thoughts on Costs and Benefits 
Ramping up liability obviously has its costs. Placement agents will 
charge issuers higher commissions for offerings to which section 11A 
applies as compensation for the increased liability risk to them and high-
er costs of a presumably more in-depth due diligence. At the same time, 
investors in these offerings should be willing to pay more for the securi-
ties knowing that (1) the placement agent performed a certain level of 
due diligence investigation as specified by SEC rules, and (2) the securi-
ties come with an implicit three-year “put right” clause (the right to sue 
for rescission under section 11A). Other possible costs include those re-
sulting from the filtering out of some good offerings (offerings by com-
panies that appeared marginal to a placement agent but ultimately would 
have succeeded) because of increased due diligence and increased litiga-
tion. 
Benefits include stronger deterrence of erroneous disclosure and 
problematic offerings, and greater incentives for various parties to per-
form due diligence. These effects should result in the more general bene-
fit of fewer private placements going bad and therefore less money lost 
by investors. My proposal may also lead to improved investor confidence 
in the private placement market. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Fundamentally, the federal securities laws are about balancing in-
vestor protection and capital formation. When it comes to private place-
ments, however, the balance is currently heavily tilted in favor of capital 
formation. In my view, this is problematic considering that private 
placements have eclipsed public offerings in terms of total dollars raised, 
yet investor protection for private placements is much weaker than for 
public offerings. Consequently, I have proposed a new civil liability pro-
vision to increase private placement investor protection. In an effort to 
get the balance right, my proposal allows private placement participants 
to tailor a private placement liability regime for a particular offering. It 
also enables the SEC to shape the due diligence defense and fine-tune it 
over time. 
I recognize that my proposal is unlikely to gain any traction with 
Congress in the near term given the current political climate and empha-
                                                 
 138. Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1964) (citing Matsuo Yoshida 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 240 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1957)). 
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sis on job creation. I did not, however, write this Article to convince 
Congress to act. My hope is that the Article will spur conversations and 
further research on whether rebalancing private placement regulation is 
warranted and, if so, whether my proposal is the best way to do it. 
